This study explored perceived benefits and risks of participation in HIV research among 33 female sex workers in Tecún Umán, Guatemala. Stigma associated with sex work and HIV was a critical barrier to research participation. Key benefits of participation included access to HIV/sti prevention and testing, as well as positive and trusting relationships between sex workers and research teams. Control exerted by managers had mixed influences on perceived research risks and benefits. Results underscore the critical need for HIV investigators to (...) develop population-tailored procedures to reduce stigma; engage managers; and reinforce trusting, reciprocal relationships between sex work communities and researchers. (shrink)

The objective of the research is focused on the study of the evolution of sexism as a cultural parameter in the Roma population whose people maintain recognition as an ethnic minority in Europe. The design selected for this study is descriptive. This study involves testing the reliability of the reduced version of the ambivalent sexism inventory (ASI; Glick and Fiske, 1996) scale among a representative group of the Roma population belonging to the city of Toledo. A representative sample of 44 (...) people aged between 16 and 40 years was selected, with an average of 27.3. The results confirm the reliability of the scale and provide little differentiation and sex-disaggregated results. The responses on the items show a high degree of sexism among the participants. The obtained results give a better understanding of the scope of gender roles and, therefore, can help us to reorient interventions in the prevention of gender inequalities or early school dropouts among Roma girls. (shrink)

El confinamiento vivido durante la pandemia de Covid 19 nos obligó a afrontar la vida con un ritmo más tranquilo. En este contexto, desde el Grupo de Estudios Interdisciplinares de Literatura y Arte (LyA) (UCLM) se planteó desarrollar un proyecto donde abordar nuestra docencia desde una perspectiva más pausada siguiendo la filosofía del Slow Movement. El objetivo de este texto es dar a conocer el trabajo que se viene desarrollando en asignaturas de Historia del Arte en los Grados de Humanidades (...) y Estudios Sociales de la Facultad de Humanidades de Albacete y de Historia del Arte de la Facultad de Letras de Ciudad Real (UCLM). (shrink)

Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism—the ‘relativism of distance’. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical. I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams's moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame, which says that when an agent's moral shortcomings by our (...) lights are a matter of their living according to the moral thinking of their day, judgements of blame are out of order. Finally, I will propose a form of moral judgement we may sometimes quite properly direct towards historically distant agents when blame is inappropriate—moral-epistemic disappointment. Together these two proposals may help release us from the grip of the idea that moral appraisal always involves the potential applicability of blame, and so from a key source of the relativist idea that moral appraisal is inappropriate over distance. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the different styles of moral relativism. The history of moral relativist thinking features different branches to the family tree, each representing a different impetus to relativism, and so producing a different style of moral relativist thought. At the root, however, is a broadly subjectivist parent idea that morality is at least in part the upshot of a shared way of life, and shared ways of life tend to vary markedly from culture to culture. The discussions cover (...) the branches of moral historicism, moral reasons, moral truth, and moral plurality. (shrink)

Heidegger has often been seen as having no moral philosophy and a political philosophy that can only support fascism. Sonia Sikka's book challenges this view, arguing instead that Heidegger should be considered a qualified moral realist, and that his insights on cultural identity and cross-cultural interaction are not invalidated by his support for Nazism. Sikka explores the ramifications of Heidegger's moral and political thought for topics including free will and responsibility, the status of humanity within the design of nature, (...) the relation between the individual and culture, the rights of peoples to political self-determination, the idea of race and the problem of racism, historical relativism, the subjectivity of values, and the nature of justice. Her discussion highlights aspects of Heidegger's thought that are still relevant for modern debates, while also addressing its limitations as reflected in his political affiliations and sympathies. (shrink)

Recent research on young children's morality has stressed the autonomous and internal nature of children's moral motivation. However, this research has mostly focused on implicit moral motives, whereas children's explicit motives have not been investigated directly. This study examined children’s explicit motives for why they want to engage in prosocial actions and avoid antisocial behavior. A total of 195 children aged 4 to 12 years were interviewed about their motives for everyday prosocial-moral actions, as well as reported on their relationship (...) with their parents. Children's explicit motives to abstain from antisocial behavior were found to be more external and less other-oriented than their motives for prosocial action. Motives that reflected higher levels of internal motivation became more frequent with age. Moreover, positive parent-child relationships predicted more other-oriented motives and greater explication of moral motives. Overall, the study provides evidence that children’s explicit moral motivation is far more heterogeneous than prominent theories of moral development (past and present) suggest. (shrink)

When we hope to explain and perhaps vindicate a practice that is internally diverse, philosophy faces a methodological challenge. Such subject matters are likely to have explanatorily basic features that are not necessary conditions. This prompts a move away from analysis to some other kind of philosophical explanation. This paper proposes a paradigm based explanation of one such subject matter: blame. First, a paradigm form of blame is identified—‘Communicative Blame’—where this is understood as a candidate for an explanatorily basic form (...) of blame. Second, its point and purpose in our lives is investigated and found to reside in its power to increase the alignment of the blamer and the wrongdoer's moral understandings. Third, the hypothesis that Communicative Blame is an explanatorily basic form of blame is tested out by seeing how far other kinds of blame can reasonably be understood as derivative, especially in respect of blame's point and purpose. Finally, a new and quasi-political worry about blame is raised. (shrink)

Moral intensity theory is used to explain how characteristics of moral issues affect ethical decision-making. According to moral intensity theory, individuals and firms will make more ethical decisions when moral intensity is present, such as greater negative consequences, including harm to customers. However, evidence suggests this does not always happen in crisis situations. For example, Fisher Price waited until 30 babies died before recalling its Rock’n Play Sleeper in 2019. In this article, the concept of immoral entrenchment is introduced to (...) address how crises affect the expected firm responses to morally intense ethical issues. Immoral entrenchment suggests that firms experience threat-rigidity responses to crises that lead to collective moral disengagement. Immoral entrenchment results in firms’ denial of responsibility and unethical behavior, instead of ethical behavior, in the face of highly negative consequences. The study in this article tests immoral entrenchment in the context of the speed to recall 843 consumer products. Supplemental qualitative evidence illustrates the collective moral disengagement dimension of immoral entrenchment. Contributing to the literature on ethics and crisis, the findings demonstrate that crises can generate immoral entrenchment in firms, which reverses the expected ethical response of those firms to issues with high moral intensity. (shrink)

The suggestion has been made that future advanced artificial intelligence (AI) that passes some consciousness-related criteria should be treated as having moral status, and therefore, humans would have an ethical obligation to consider its well-being. In this paper, the author discusses the extent to which software and robots already pass proposed criteria for consciousness; and argues against the moral status for AI on the grounds that human malware authors may design malware to fake consciousness. In fact, the article warns that (...) malware authors have stronger incentives than do authors of legitimate software to create code that passes some of the criteria. Thus, code that appears to be benign, but is in fact malware, might become the most common form of software to be treated as having moral status. (shrink)

This article explores gender inequities and sexual double standards in teens’ digital image exchange, drawing on a UK qualitative research project on youth ‘sexting’. We develop a critique of ‘postfeminist’ media cultures, suggesting teen ‘sexting’ presents specific age and gender related contradictions: teen girls are called upon to produce particular forms of ‘sexy’ self display, yet face legal repercussions, moral condemnation and ‘slut shaming’ when they do so. We examine the production/circulation of gendered value and sexual morality via teens’ discussions (...) of activities on Facebook and Blackberry. For instance, some boys accumulated ‘ratings’ by possessing and exchanging images of girls’ breasts, which operated as a form of currency and value. Girls, in contrast, largely discussed the taking, sharing or posting of such images as risky, potentially inciting blame and shame around sexual reputation (e.g. being called ‘slut’, ‘slag’ or ‘sket’). The daily negotiations of these new digitally mediated, heterosexualised, classed and raced norms of performing teen feminine and masculine desirability are considered. (shrink)

What is hospitality? Who is it addressed to? Hospitality aims at welcoming those who arrive; it demands giving space and time and sharing our own resources with others. In view of the current global migration crisis and in the midst of the social debates and a critique of the failure of affluent countries and Western democracies to respond in solidarity to those in need, this article attempts to re-consider the space for hospitality drawing from the ethical and the political as (...) the two fundamental pillars of social architecture. In an effort to discuss collective grassroots reactions to this general lack of hospitality, I address the Catalan social platform Volem Acollir in their request to the state to open up the borders for the reception of a larger number of migrants. Far from being an individual choice, or an optional political decision, hospitality confronts us with the moral dilemma of the human response to our cultural others. (shrink)

One of the objectives in the field of artificial intelligence for some decades has been the development of artificial agents capable of coexisting in harmony with people and other systems. The computing research community has made efforts to design artificial agents capable of doing tasks the way people do, tasks requiring cognitive mechanisms such as planning, decision-making, and learning. The application domains of such software agents are evident nowadays. Humans are experiencing the inclusion of artificial agents in their environment as (...) unmanned vehicles, intelligent houses, and humanoid robots capable of caring for people. In this context, research in the field of machine ethics has become more than a hot topic. Machine ethics focuses on developing ethical mechanisms for artificial agents to be capable of engaging in moral behavior. However, there are still crucial challenges in the development of truly Artificial Moral Agents. This paper aims to show the current status of Artificial Moral Agents by analyzing models proposed over the past two decades. As a result of this review, a taxonomy to classify Artificial Moral Agents according to the strategies and criteria used to deal with ethical problems is proposed. The presented review aims to illustrate (1) the complexity of designing and developing ethical mechanisms for this type of agent, and (2) that there is a long way to go (from a technological perspective) before this type of artificial agent can replace human judgment in difficult, surprising or ambiguous moral situations. (shrink)

A filosofia moral tradicional estabelece o critério da posse da razão como exigência para a definição da pertinência ou não de um sujeito à comunidade moral humana, e, pois, a ser considerado digno de respeito ético e justiça. Contrariando a tradição moral, Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Tom Regan e Paul W. Taylor redefinem a constituição da comunidade moral e o alcance da justiça, estabelecendo a perspectiva dos que são afetados pelas ações morais, não a dos sujeitos morais agentes, como a referência (...) para se tomar decisões éticas relativas à justiça. Enquanto a filosofia moral tradicional considera apenas a categoria dos sujeitos morais agentes, estes autores desdobram a sujeição moral em duas possibilidades: a da agência e a da paciência moral. Com este desdobramento, mantêm-se a estatura dos agentes racionais como responsáveis pela moralidade, enquanto a vulnerabilidade às ações e decisões dos sujeitos morais agentes é levada em conta, permitindo a inclusão na comunidade moral e da justiça de interesses nãoracionais, de animais e ecossistemas nãoanimados, por exemplo. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Agentes morais. Pacientes morais. Agência moral. Paciência moral. Responsabilidade. Vulnerabilidade. Kenneth E. Goodpaster. Tom Regan. Paul W. Taylor. ABSTRACT Traditional moral philosophy establishes reason as the only criterion for someone being morally considerable or recognized as member of the moral community. In contrast, Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Tom Regan and Paul W. Taylor do not agree with the moral tradition. On their perspective, the standpoint not of the agent but of the “patient” should be the central question of ethics in defining to whom principles of morality apply. While traditional philosophy operates only with the category of moral agents, these authors operates with both categories, moral agent and moral patient. They maintain that responsibility is the most significant question in defining the framework of human morality, a necessary condition to someone being considered a moral agent, possible only for rational beings, while vulnerability is the condition of being subjected to moral decisions and actions, independently of being rational or non rational. Being subjected to human morality is not a prerogative of rational beings. There are non rational interests common to humans, animals and plants, the inherent worth of life, for example, that are continuously subjected to human decisions. So, those have to be considered by ethics and justice. In order to be morally considerable it is not necessary to be rational, it is sufficient to be vulnerable to moral agency. KEY WORDS – Moral agent. Moral patient. Moral agency. Moral patience. Responsibility. Vulnerability. Kenneth E. Goodpaster. Tom Regan. Paul W. Taylor. (shrink)

There are two kinds of forgiveness that appear as radically different from one another: one presents forgiveness as essentially earned through remorseful apology; the other presents it as fundamentally non-earned—a gift. The first, which I label Moral Justice Forgiveness, adopts a stance of moral demand and conditionality; the second, which I label Gifted Forgiveness, adopts a stance of non-demand and un-conditionality. Each is real; yet how can two such different responses to wrongdoing be of one and the same kind? This (...) paper explains how, by showing that the basic role each plays in moral-social life is the same; and that one is conceptually and therefore historically prior to the other. The result is pluralism, with each kind of forgiveness represented as distinctive in both its psychology and its normativity; and yet an ordered pluralism—with Moral Justice Forgiveness revealed as the root kind, and Gifted Forgiveness a culturally contingent iteration. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta argumentos a favor del diseño de políticas públicas sensibles al desafío multicultural y, en especial, a la circunstancia de que la cultura es un elemento crucial para la identidad individual. En primer lugar, repasa la querella entre liberales y comunitaristas como la fuente del actual debate. Luego, analiza la reacción de Rawls ante la crítica comunitarista. En tercer lugar, expone críticamente las tres grandes concepciones-modelo que intentan hacerse cargo del pluralismo cultural. Y, para finalizar, esboza una posible (...) respuesta a las demandas de las minorías étnicas. (shrink)

The notion of recognition is an ethically potent resource for understanding human relational needs; and its negative counterpart, misrecognition, an equally potent resource for critique. Axel Honneth’s rich account focuses our attention on recognition’s role in securing basic self-confidence, moral self-respect, and self-esteem. With these loci of recognition in place, we are enabled to raise the intriguing question whether each of these may be extended to apply specifically to the epistemic dimension of our agency and selfhood. Might we talk intelligibly—while (...) staying in tune with Honneth’s concepts and their Hegelian key—of a generic idea of epistemic recognition? Such an idea might itself be seen to apply at the same three levels to indicate: first, basic epistemic self-confidence; second, our status as epistemically responsible; and third, a certain epistemic self-esteem that reflects the epistemic esteem we receive from others. The papers in this volume surely sound a chord in the affirmative, and together they steer us towards a multifaceted conception of how epistemic injustice is related to epistemic misrecognition, and indeed how we might construe a positive relation of epistemic recognition. (shrink)

This introductory text encourages students to engage with key problems and arguments in ethics through a series of classic and contemporary readings. The text will inspire students to think about the distinctive nature of moral philosophy, and to draw comparisons between different traditions of thought, between ancient and modern philosophies, and between theoretical and literary writing about the place of value in human life. Each of the book's six chapters focuses on a particular theme: the nature of goodness, subjectivity and (...) objectivity in ethical thinking, justice and virtue, moral motivation, the place of moral obligation, and the idea that literature can be a form of moral philosophy. Each chapter features two or three key readings, drawn from texts as diverse as Plato's Republic, J. S. Mill's Utilitarianism, Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Rawls' A Theory of Justice. The readings are all accompanied by interactive commentary from the editors. (shrink)

Clarifying the concept of emotions is an essential task of 21st century societies. We cannot continue living if we ignore the importance they have in our everyday thinking and acting. Emotions are fundamental both to the private and the public sphere It is becoming increasingly important to learn to identify what we feel and what those around us feel, how we express these feelings and understand their consequences, in order to enable us to transform harmful emotions into others more favorable (...) to the well-being of our personal relationships and our relationship with the environment. With this objective in mind, my text proposes a form of emotional education in the framework of peace education, initiated in early childhood, which acts to develop the emotional capacity required for the realization of a form of critical, ethical and creative global citizenship. This work recovers the methodology of the school of philosophy with children, which gives a great sense of philosophical praxis to the text, by putting it in dialogue, also, with studies in philosophy for peace. Thus, it is essential to vindicate empathy and moral imagination from the time we are children. Through thinking based on care, fthe cultivation of an emotional education will stimulate to wonder about other emotional alternatives, escaping from our own limits and exploring the perspectives of others until we come to merge with their horizons. (shrink)

Heidegger’s Being and Time has been accused of espousing empty decisionism and relativism. I argue, first, that in fact Being and Time’s stress on the situated character of human judgment is supplemented by a very Kantian account of being human that defi nes appropriate behavior towards all entities possessing a certain character. Its analysis of conscience and guilt attempts to uncover the existential basis for the distinction Kant draws between the phenomenal and the noumenal aspects of the self. Building on (...) this analysis, I claim, Being and Time reaffirms the second version of Kant’s categorical imperative, which states that humanity should never be treated merely as a means, but always also as an end in itself. In the second part of the paper, however, I argue that this proximity to Kant is part of the problem with Being and Time, that some of this work’s shortcomings and dangers in relation to ethics rest precisely in its very Kantian view of what makes an entity worthy of moral concern, and what is owed to others in virtue of their being such worthy entities. As a consequence of this view, not only are all nonhuman animals excluded from moral concern, but, strangely, the intrinsic value of human well-being is itself threatened. (shrink)

Heidegger’s Being and Time has been accused of espousing empty decisionism and relativism. I argue, first, that in fact Being and Time’s stress on the situated character of human judgment is supplemented by a very Kantian account of being human that defi nes appropriate behavior towards all entities possessing a certain character. Its analysis of conscience and guilt attempts to uncover the existential basis for the distinction Kant draws between the phenomenal and the noumenal aspects of the self. Building on (...) this analysis, I claim, Being and Time reaffirms the second version of Kant’s categorical imperative, which states that humanity should never be treated merely as a means, but always also as an end in itself. In the second part of the paper, however, I argue that this proximity to Kant is part of the problem with Being and Time, that some of this work’s shortcomings and dangers in relation to ethics rest precisely in its very Kantian view of what makes an entity worthy of moral concern, and what is owed to others in virtue of their being such worthy entities. As a consequence of this view, not only are all nonhuman animals excluded from moral concern, but, strangely, the intrinsic value of human well-being is itself threatened. (shrink)

Taking on topics from pornography and prostitution to female genital mutilation, from womens magazines and marriage to sexual violence, contributors in this collection argue that the kind of liberal feminism currently rising to prominence does little to challenge the status quo.

While much is known about the prevalence and impact of incivility in the workplace, relatively less is known about those who instigate workplace incivility. This research aims to investigate incivility instigation through a moral lens by examining the roles of other-condemning moral emotions (contempt, disgust, and anger) and appraisals of coworkers’ morality as predictors of this behavior at work. In Study 1, we used structural equation modeling to analyze two waves of self-report data collected from a sample of 447 full-time (...) United States (U.S.) working adults. Findings from this study indicate that appraising coworkers as low in morality elicited feelings of contempt, disgust, and anger. However, only contempt predicted incivility instigation and mediated the relationship between appraising coworkers as low in morality and instigating incivility. In Study 2, we collected self-report data from a sample of 309 full-time U.S. workers using a critical incident technique. Structural equation modeling was used to analyze the data. Results from Study 2 replicated the association between low morality appraisals and contempt, anger, and disgust found in Study 1. However, anger predicted incivility instigation and mediated the relationship between appraising coworkers as low in morality and instigating incivility. Additionally, contempt and perceived civility norms had an interactive effect on instigated incivility. These studies provide insight into the roles of contempt, disgust, and anger in predicting incivility instigation, suggesting that employees may engage in incivility to condemn others who engage in moral transgressions. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

Our ideas about forgiveness seem to oscillate between idealization and scepticism. How should we make sense of this apparent conflict? This paper argues that we should learn something from each, seeing these views as representing opposing moments in a perennial and well-grounded moral ambivalence towards forgiveness. Once we are correctly positioned, we shall see an aspect of forgiveness that recommends precisely this ambivalence. For what will come into view will be certain key psychological mechanisms of moral-epistemic influence – other-addressed and (...) self-addressed mechanisms of moral social construction – that enable forgiveness to function well when it is well-functioning, but which are also intrinsically prone to deterioration into one or another form of bad faith. Thus forgiveness is revealed as necessarily containing seeds of its own corruption, showing ambivalence to be a generically appropriate attitude. Moreover, it is emphasized that where forgiver and forgiven are relating to one another in the context of asymmetries of social power, the practice of forgiveness is likely to be further compromised, notably increasing the risk of negative influence on the moral-epistemic states of either the forgiver or the forgiven, or both. (shrink)

Heidegger’s Being and Time has been accused of espousing empty decisionism and relativism. I argue, first, that in fact Being and Time’s stress on the situated character of human judgment is supplemented by a very Kantian account of being human that defi nes appropriate behavior towards all entities possessing a certain character. Its analysis of conscience and guilt attempts to uncover the existential basis for the distinction Kant draws between the phenomenal and the noumenal aspects of the self. Building on (...) this analysis, I claim, Being and Time reaffirms the second version of Kant’s categorical imperative, which states that humanity should never be treated merely as a means, but always also as an end in itself. In the second part of the paper, however, I argue that this proximity to Kant is part of the problem with Being and Time, that some of this work’s shortcomings and dangers in relation to ethics rest precisely in its very Kantian view of what makes an entity worthy of moral concern, and what is owed to others in virtue of their being such worthy entities. As a consequence of this view, not only are all nonhuman animals excluded from moral concern, but, strangely, the intrinsic value of human well-being is itself threatened. (shrink)

While experience often affords important knowledge and insight that is difficult to garner through observation or testimony alone, it also has the potential to generate conflicts of interest and unrepresentative perspectives. We call this tension the paradox of experience. In this paper, we first outline appeals to experience made in debates about access to unproven medical products and disability bioethics, as examples of how experience claims arise in bioethics and some of the challenges raised by these claims. We then motivate (...) the idea that experience can be an asset by appealing to themes in feminist and moral epistemology, distinguishing between epistemic and justice-based appeals. Next, we explain the concern that experience may be a liability by appealing to empirical work on cognitive biases and theoretical work about the problem of partial representation. We conclude with preliminary recommendations for addressing the paradox and offer several questions for future discussion. (shrink)

Unresolved disagreements on issues of access, censorship, and privacy within the information profession can be dangerous when entrepreneurial interests outweigh the public good and as corporations anticipate financial gain from placing limitations on information retrieval and use. The information profession can benefit from a grounding of its core values in a robust moral framework that can coherently place demands on interested parties. We argue that grounding the core values of privacy and ubiquitous access to information in a needs-based theory of (...) rights is most suitable within the unique context of the information profession. (shrink)

El problema ético de la huelga de hambre ha dado cabida a soluciones contrapuestas, incluso en el contexto de teorías éticas que rechazan el suicidio. Algunos piensan que la sola honestidad del fin subjetivo basta para justificar la acción del huelguista. Otros, aunque son minoría, sostienen que la huelga de hambre es un acto reprobable per se, porque implica un atentado directo contra la vida o salud del sujeto. En este trabajo se defiende esta última interpretación. A juicio de los (...) autores, la huelga de hambre es un caso de suicidio intencional. Luego, nunca es lícito, bajo ningún aspecto, llevar adelante una acción de esta naturaleza. (shrink)

In her groundbreaking book, Epistemic Injustice, renowned moral philosopher and social epistemologist Miranda Fricker coined the term epistemic injustice to draw attention to the pervasive impact of epistemic oppression on marginalized social groups. Fricker’s account spurred a flurry of scholarship regarding the discriminatory impact of epistemic injustice and gave birth to a domain of philosophical inquiry that has extended far beyond the disciplinary boundaries of philosophy. In this interview, Fricker responds to questions posed by A. C. Nikolaidis and Winston (...) C. Thompson that address the ways in which epistemic injustice intersects with education as a human endeavour and social institution. In doing so, Fricker reflects on her motivations in writing her book more than fifteen years ago and explicitly addresses some of the most significant contributions of the concept of epistemic injustice as a tool for analysing issues in education. She also offers insights on the purpose of education, outlines educational manifestations of epistemic injustice, and discusses the virtues that educators must exhibit and inculcate in their students in order for epistemic justice to obtain. (shrink)

In 2008 the authors held Involving Interface, a lively interdisciplinary event focusing on issues of biological, sociocultural, and technological interfacing (see Acknowledgments). Inspired by discussions at this event, in this article, we further discuss the value of input from neuroscience for developing robots and machine interfaces, and the value of philosophy, the humanities, and the arts for identifying persistent links between human interfacing and broader ethical concerns. The importance of ongoing interdisciplinary debate and public communication on scientific and technical advances (...) is also highlighted. Throughout, the authors explore the implications of the extended mind hypothesis for notions of moral accountability and robotics. (shrink)

Estas reflexões têm como objetivo principal mostrar a surpreendente coincidência de intuições que se verifica entre Sêneca e Freud no que diz respeito ao conceito de consciência moral e, mais precisamente, à questão do sentimento de culpa. Efetivamente, tanto o estoico romano quanto o inventor da psicanálise sondaram e exploraram com uma acuidade insuperável a dinâmica que se desenrola no interior do sujeito quanto à representação que ele se faz das chamadas más ações. Isto significa que toda diferença se anula (...) entre, de um lado, o desejo de cometer uma má ação e, de outro, o pôr em prática a mesma ação desejada. Em outros termos, a intenção e o ato se equivalem, porquanto o sujeito já desejou executá-lo. O sentimento de culpa, para Freud, nasce da interiorização da autoridade ou do supereu, que é a instância da censura ou da reprovação. Portanto, o sujeito se torna doravante o seu próprio tribunal, o seu próprio algoz. (shrink)

El presente escrito argumenta que en la propuesta intuicionista desarrollada en Haidt (2001) no se distingue claramente una propuesta intuicionista de una propuesta emotivista. Esto supone un problema epistémico, pues la primera se comprende desde una perspectiva cognitivista,mientras que la segunda lo es desde una postura no cognitivista en el ámbito moral. Hay por tanto una tensión en los presupuestos de la propuesta intuicionista haidtiana, que inter alia Huemer (2005) discute desde una perspectiva racionalista moderada. Este escrito sostiene que elintuicionismo (...) no supone un compromiso con la discusión entre objetivismo y subjetivismo moral, permitiendo de este modo una aproximación que permita un diálogo fructífero entre el emotivismo, el intuicionismo y el racionalismo en el estatus epistémico del juicio moral. Ello permite abordar la arista del estatuto moral desde una posición racionalista moderada, abierta a los aportes interdisciplinares y de este modo al naturalismo no reduccionista. Este análisis permite afirmar que sí hay verdades morales, siendo el foco de discusión objetivismo-subjetivismo más bien sobre el acceso a ellas, que del cuestionamiento de su existencia. (shrink)

Bernard Williams’ philosophy is shaped by a distinctive and abiding interest in the borderlands between Philosophy and History. He famously considers moral philosophy, and particularly moral theory, to over‐step the border that marks the real ‘limits’ of the discipline, and in his later work he explicitly advances the idea of doing ‘impure’ philosophy, by which he meant philosophy that mixed itself with history. By examining the complex impression left on Williams’ historical self‐consciousness by his engagements with two very different figures (...) in the history of philosophy, namely Descartes and Wittgenstein, I will explore a number of ways in which philosophy and history are closely intertwined for Williams. This will draw out the positive vision he modelled for us of ‘impure’ philosophy—a philosophical style he took to contribute to nurturing philosophy as a humanistic discipline. (shrink)

Nel Noddings, one of the central figures in the contemporary discussion of ethics and moral education, argues that caring--a way of life learned at home--can be extended into a theory that guides social policy. Tackling issues such as capital punishment, drug treatment, homelessness, mental illness, and abortion, Noddings inverts traditional philosophical priorities to show how an ethic of care can have profound and compelling implications for social and political thought. Instead of beginning with an ideal state and then describing a (...) role for home and family, this book starts with an ideal home and asks how what is learned there may be extended to the larger social domain. Noddings examines the tension between freedom and equality that characterized liberal thought in the twentieth century and finds that--for all its strengths--liberalism is still inadequate as social policy. She suggests instead that an attitude of attentive love in the home induces a corresponding responsiveness that can serve as a foundation for social policy. With her characteristic sensitivity to the individual and to the vulnerable in society, the author concludes that any corrective practice that does more harm than the behavior it is aimed at correcting should be abandoned. This suggests an end to the disastrous war on drugs. In addition, Noddings states that the caring professions that deal with the homeless should be guided by flexible policies that allow practitioners to respond adequately to the needs of very different clients. She recommends that the school curriculum should include serious preparation for home life as well as for professional and civic life. Emphasizing the importance of improving life in everyday homes and the possible role social policy might play in this improvement, _Starting at Home_ highlights the inextricable link between the development of care in individual lives and any discussion of moral life and social policy. (shrink)

This study focused on value transmission in the family and assessed adolescents’ acceptance of the values their parents want to transmit to them (socialisation values), identifying some factors that may affect the level of acceptance. Specifically, actual value agreement between parents, parental agreement as perceived by adolescents, parent–child closeness and promotion of child’s volitional functioning, were considered as predictors. Participants were 381 family triads (father, mother and adolescent child) from northern Italy; the adolescents (46.2% male) were all high‐school students from (...) 15 to 19 years of age. Both parents and their children filled out self‐report questionnaires. Findings showed a moderate level of acceptance in families, suggesting the presence of similarities as well as differences between parents’ socialisation values and adolescents’ personal values. All the predictors considered except parents’ actual agreement, were found to be significantly and positively related to acceptance. Implications for moral development are discussed and suggestions for education and future research are provided. (shrink)